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Predicting how cooperative behavior arises in the thermodynamic limit is one of the outstanding
problems in evolutionary game theory. For two player games, cooperation is seldom the Nash
equilibrium. However, in the thermodynamic limit cooperation is the natural recourse regardless
of whether we are dealing with humans or animals. In this work we use the analogy with the Ising
model to predict how cooperation arises in the thermodynamic limit.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The solution to any game theoretic problem involves
finding an equilibrium strategy known as the Nash equi-
librium, whence deviating from this strategy brings in
more loss to the player. However, many times the Nash
equilibrium is not the best possible outcome. The best
outcome in a game is known as Pareto optimal which
is the maximum benefit that both players can simulta-
neously have in that game. For example, in Prisoners
dilemma the Nash equilibrium is both players choose to
defect, however the Pareto optimal strategy would be
both players choosing to cooperate. An introduction to
Nash equilibrium for two player two strategy games can
be found in [1].
Game theory is not just about two players, many situ-
ations arise wherein one needs to go beyond two players.
To analyze conflicts between countries, which is seldom
between just two countries many other countries are in-
volved too. For example, price fixing by the oil cartel
OPEC, which is a fourteen country club. Further, the
United Nations is a 190 country institution. However,
for human beings, one has to go to millions to see how
humans organize and form collectives like state, religion
and country. To analyze such a situation in a game the-
oretic setting one needs to go beyond two players to a
game with infinite number of players, i.e., the thermody-
namic limit.
A particularly interesting problem arises in the con-
text of evolution, where we see that cooperation arises
even when defection is the preferred choice of individuals
[2]. Cooperation in short term might not seem beneficial
however, in the long run the population which cooperates
survives. It has been shown in Ref. [3] that in iterative
Prisoner’s dilemma, cooperation can become the Nash
equilibrium given the number of players are finite and
some players can opt for tit-for-tat scheme, i.e., if the op-
ponent defects in one turn then in the next turn, player
himself defects. In this paper, we use statistical mechan-
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ics tools to see whether and how cooperation emerges in
the thermodynamic limit.
Using the analogy with the 1D Ising model, we try to
understand the equilibrium strategy in a population and
predict how cooperative behavior emerges in the ther-
modynamic limit. We model a situation similar to 1D
Ising model, where the sites are replaced by players and
spin up or spin down correspond to the strategies s1 or
s2 adopted by the players. Magnetization in Ising model
is defined as the difference in the number of spin up and
spin down particles. Similarly, Magnetization in game
theory can be defined as the difference in the number of
players choosing strategy s1 or s2. We first relate the
Ising model to the payoff’s in game theory and then ap-
ply this method first to Prisoner’s dilemma and then to
game of Chicken (variant of Hawk-Dove game). There
have been earlier attempts to use the 1D Ising model to
find the equilibrium strategy in the thermodynamic limit
[2]. We find that there are some unphysical implications
of the results of Ref. [2].
This paper is organized as follows-section II connects
the 1D Ising model to the payoffs of game theory by ex-
tending the analogy of Ref. [4] to the thermodynamic
limit, then in section III we calculate the Magnetization
which gives the Nash equilibrium strategy for Prisoner’s
dilemma in the thermodynamic limit. We observe how
cooperators arise in Prisoner’s dilemma in the thermody-
namic limit even when defection is the Nash equilibrium.
Further, we deal with the problems associated with the
model of Ref. [2] in brief. In section IV we do a similar
analysis for the game of Chicken which has no unique
pure strategy Nash equilibrium in the two player case.
We find how in the thermodynamic limit majority of co-
operators can emerge. We end with the conclusions.
II. 1D ISING MODEL AND GAME THEORY
The 1D Ising model [5] consists of spins that can be
in either of the two states +1 (↑) or −1 (↓). The spins
are arranged in a line, and can only interact with their
nearest neighbors. The Hamiltonian of such a system can
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2be written as
H = −J
N∑
i=1
σiσi+1 − h
N∑
i=1
σi, (1)
where J is the coupling between the spins, h is the exter-
nal magnetic field and σ’s denote the spin. The partition
function corresponding to the Hamiltonian (Eq. (1)) is
Z =
∑
σ1
...
∑
σN
eβ(J
∑N
i=1 σiσi+1+h/2
∑N
i=1(σi+σi+1)), (2)
β denotes the inverse temperature 1/KBT . σi denotes ei-
ther the spin up (+1) or spin down (-1). In order to carry
out the spin sum, we define a matrix T with elements as
follows,
< σ|T |σ′ > = eβ(Jσσ′+h/2(σ+σ′)).
Using the transfer matrix and carrying out the spin sum
via the completeness relation, the partition function from
Eq. (2) in the large N limit can be written as
Z = eNβJ(cosh(βh)±
√
sinh2(βh) + e−4βJ)N . (3)
Since the Free energy F = −KTlnZ, the Magnetization
is
m = − df
dh
=
sinh(βh)√
sinh2(βh) + e−4βJ
. (4)
In Fig. 1, we plot the Magnetization vs. the external
magnetic field h for different values of temperature.
FIG. 1. Variation of Magnetization with the external mag-
netic field h for J = .05
In Ref. [4], it has been shown that a one-to-one corre-
spondence can be made between 1D Ising model Hamil-
tonian and the payoff matrix for a particular game. We
first look at a general payoff matrix for two player game
and understand the method of Ref. [4],
U =
 s1 s2s1 a, a′ b, b′
s2 c, c
′ d, d′
 , (5)
where U(si, sj) is the payoff function with a, b, c, d as the
payoffs for row player and a′, b′, c′, d′ are the payoffs for
column player, s1 and s2 denote the strategies adopted
by the two players. For symmetric games, generally the
payoff is written for only the row player and the payoffs
for column player can be inferred from them. Thus,
U =
 s1 s2s1 a b
s2 c d
 . (6)
Making a transformation, by adding of a factor λ to the
s1 column and µ to the s2 column, we have-
U =
 s1 s2s1 a+ λ b+ µ
s2 c+ λ d+ µ
 . (7)
As shown in Ref. [4], under such a transformation the
Nash equilibrium doesn’t change (see appendix for more
details). Following Ref. [4] and choosing the transforma-
tions as λ = −a+c2 and µ = − b+d2 . The transformed
matrix becomes-
U =
 s1 s2s1 a−c2 b−d2
s2
c−a
2
d−b
2
 . (8)
To calculate the Nash equilibrium of a generalized two
player game in the thermodynamic limit, we have to re-
late the transformed payoff matrix of the classical game
as in Eq. (8) to the Ising model Hamiltonian with two
spins. When N = 2, the Hamiltonian (Eq. (1)) can be
written as-
H = −J(σ1σ2 + σ2σ1)− h(σ1 + σ2) (9)
So the individual energies of the spins 1 and 2 can be
written as:
E1 = −Jσ1σ2 − hσ1, E2 = −Jσ2σ1 − hσ2. (10)
It is to be noted that equilibrium in Ising model corre-
sponds to minimizing the energies of spins. Now for sym-
metric coupling as in Eq.’s (2,9) minimizing Hamiltonian
H with respect to spins σ1, σ2 is same as maximizing −H
with respect to σ1, σ2. In game theory, players search for
the Nash equilibrium. This implies maximizing the pay-
off function U(si, sj) Eq.’s (5-8) with respect to strategies
si, sj which for the two player Ising model is equivalent
to maximizing −Ei Eq. (10) with respect to spins σi, σj .
Thus, the Ising game matrix can be written (see Ref. [4]
for derivation of Eq. (11)) for the row player as- s2 = +1 s2 = −1s1 = +1 J + h −J + h
s1 = −1 −J − h J − h
 . (11)
3Comparing the matrix elements of the transformed payoff
matrix- Eq. (8) to the Ising game matrix Eq. (11), we
get the relation between parameters of Ising model (J
and h) and the payoffs of two player game as-
J =
a− c+ d− b
4
, h =
a− c+ b− d
4
.
This completes the connection of the payoffs from a two
player game to Ising model relating spins in the ther-
modynamic limit. β in Ising model is the inverse tem-
perature. Decreasing β or increasing the temperature in-
creases the randomness of the spin orientation. Thus, de-
creasing β in Magnetization for game matrix Eq.’s (4,11)
increases randomness in the strategic choices of the play-
ers. In the following sections we will apply this to some
famous two player games so as to analyze them in the
thermodynamic limit.
III. PRISONER’S DILEMMA
In this game, the police are questioning two suspects in
separate cells. Each has two choices: to cooperate with
each other and not confess the crime (C), or defect to
the police and confess the crime (D). We construct the
Prisoner’s dilemma payoff matrix by taking the matrix
elements from Eq.’s (5,6) as a = r, d = p, b = s and
c = t, with t > r > p > s where r is the reward, t
is the temptation, s is the sucker’s payoff and p is the
punishment. Thus, the payoff matrix is-
U =
 C DC r, r s, t
D t, s p, p
 . (12)
The values in the payoff matrix can be explained as
follows- reward r means 1 year in jail while punishment
p means 10 years in jail, sucker’s payoff s represents a
life sentence while temptation t implies no jail time. In-
dependent of the other suspects choice, one can improve
his own position by defecting. Therefore the Nash equi-
librium in this case is to defect. However if both players
trusted each other and chose to cooperate, then both have
to spend less time in jail, so the Pareto optimal strategy
is to cooperate. This is the dilemma [1].
Following the calculations in section II to make the
connection with the Ising Hamiltonian, we add λ =
−a+c2 = − r+t2 to column 1 and µ = − b+d2 = − s+p2 to
column 2 of the payoff matrix Eq. (12). The transformed
payoff matrix for the row player is-
U =
 C DC r−t2 s−p2
D − r−t2 p−s2
 .
Comparing this to the Ising game matrix Eq. (11) , we
have J+h = r−t2 and J−h = p−s2 . Solving these simulta-
neous equations, we get J = r−t+p−s4 and h =
r+s−t−p
4 .
From Ising model, the Magnetization in the thermody-
namic limit Eq. (4) is-
m =
sinh(βh)√
sinh2(βh) + e−4βJ
=
sinh(β r+s−p−t
4
)√
sinh2(β r+s−t−p
4
) + e−β(r−t+p−s)
.
(13)
Plotting Magnetization as in Eq. (13) for all values of
FIG. 2. Variation of Magnetization (m) with the punishment
p (defect payoff) for Prisoner’s dilemma for t = 5, s = 0
and r = 3. Lowering punishment from 1 to .5 increases the
number of cooperators by 30 %.
s < p < r, in the thermodynamic limit Nash equilibrium
is always the defect strategy. A phase transition would
occur only if p < t − r − s which is not possible as the
punishment p > s. When β decreases, Magnetization
decreases, which implies that number of cooperators in-
creases. As β → 0, m → 0, implying equal number of
cooperators and defectors. At finite and large β as seen
from Fig. 2, in the thermodynamic limit for p > 1.5 al-
most all are defectors. However, in the range 0 < p < 1.5
there is a drastic decrease in the number of defectors
so much so that around p = .5 regardless of β in the
thermodynamic limit 35 % of the population tend to co-
operate. In the next section we approach this problem
via the method proposed in Ref. [2] and unravel some
deficiencies in the method of Ref. [2].
A. Problems with the approach of Ref. [2]
The connection between Ising model and game theory
as shown in section II is not the only approach avail-
able. In Ref. [2] too, it has been shown that in the
thermodynamic limit games can be modeled using 1D
Ising model. However, when one analyses the Prisoner’s
dilemma game using the approach of Ref. [2], the results
are not compatible with the basic tenets of the game for
some cases, as shown below.
41. When reward r approaches temptation b
Considering the Prisoner’s dilemma payoff matrix as
in Eq. (14) below
U =
 C DC r, r −c, b
D b,−c 0, 0
 . (14)
where r = b− c, b > r > 0 and b > c > 0. The Eq. (14)
is the payoff matrix used in Ref. [2]. This is similar to
Eq. (12) by taking reward as r, temptation as b, sucker’s
payoff as −c and punishment as 0 with the condition
r = b − c. The Magnetization is found in Ref. [2] using
a different approach than section II to be-
m =
e−βr − 1
(1 + e−βr)
. (15)
This magnetization is independent of temptation b unlike
that derived in Eq. (13).
Although in Ref. [2] it has been shown that for all
values of reward r, the dominant choice is to defect but
this is not true in the limiting case when r approaches b.
We analyze the same situation using the payoff matrix of
the Prisoner’s dilemma and we see an inconsistency-
U =
 C DC b, b 0, b
D b, 0 0, 0
 . (16)
When reward r equals the temptation b, there is no
unique Nash equilibrium, i.e., both strategies coopera-
tion and defection are equiprobable. The players can
equally choose between cooperation and defection and
hence Magnetization (m) should be 0. However, from
Ref. [2] the Magnetization is negative (see Fig. 3 inset)
which means that defect is the Nash equilibrium which
is not correct.
2. The reward r approaches 0
Another situation where Ref. [2]’s results are negated
is when r = 0, m tends to 0 as in Eq. (14) implying equal
number of cooperators and defectors. However, when we
look at the payoff matrix (Eq. (14)) for r = 0:
U =
 C DC 0, 0 −b, b
D b,−b 0, 0
 , (17)
As can be clearly seen in Fig. 3 inset, defection is still
the Nash equilibrium which is not correct.
From our calculations as done in section II, III and
using payoff matrix Eq. (14) we get the Magnetization
as m = tanh(β r−b2 ) where we have substituted t = b, s =
FIG. 3. Variation of Magnetization with r for Prisoner’s
dilemma when b = 5. For all values of b > r > 0 there is
no phase transition. When r = b = 5, the Magnetization is
0 as expected. Also when r = 0, Magnetization is negative
which means defect is the Nash equilibrium. Inset: Varia-
tion of Magnetization with reward r for Prisoner’s dilemma
as calculated in Ref. [2]. When r = b, (say b = 5) the Magne-
tization → -1 and when r = 0 the Magnetization is 0. These
results are not compatible with the definition of Prisoner’s
dilemma.
−c, p = 0 with the condition r = b− c in Eq. (13). From
Fig. 3 as reward r approaches temptation b, the m→ 0.
Further, when reward r approaches 0, the m → -1. Our
approach corrects the problems in Ref. [2] in the limiting
cases when r → 0 and r → b. This will be elaborately
dealt with in Ref. [6] along with the case of Public goods
game with and without punishment. In the next section
we extend this approach to the game of Chicken.
IV. GAME OF CHICKEN
The name “Chicken” has its origins in a game in which
two teenagers drive their vehicles towards each other at
high speeds[1]. Each has two strategies: one is to swerve
and the other is going straight. If one teenager swerves
and the other drives straight, then the one who swerved
will be called a ”Chicken” or coward. “Hawk−Dove”
game, on the other hand refers to a situation in which
players compete for a shared resource and can choose
either mediate (Dove strategy) or fight for the resource
(Hawk strategy).
The parameterized payoff matrix from Eq. (5) by tak-
ing a = −s, b = r, c = −r and d = 0 for the game of
Chicken is given by-
U =
 straight swervestraight −s,−s r,−r
swerve −r, r 0, 0
 , (18)
where “r” denotes the reputation and “s” denotes the
cost of injury and s > r > 0. If one teen swerves be-
fore the other, then the one who drives straight gains in
reputation while the other loses reputation. However, if
5both drive straight, there is a crash, and both are in-
jured. There are two pure strategy Nash equilibriums
(straight, swerve) and (swerve, straight). Each gives a
payoff of r to one player and -r to the other. There is
another mixed strategy Nash equilibrium given by (σ, σ),
where [σ = p.straight+(1− p).swerve] where p = rs (p is
the probability to choose straight). In “Hawk-dove” the
reputation from game of “Chicken” is replaced by the
value of resource and the cost of injury doesn’t change.
Similar to game of “Chicken”, the Hawk-Dove game has
two pure strategy Nash equilibrium: (Hawk, Dove) and
(Dove, Hawk) and a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium
(σ, σ): [σ = p.Hawk +(1− p).Dove]. Thus, from a game-
theoretic point of view, “Chicken” and “Hawk−Dove”
are identical.
FIG. 4. Variation of Magnetization with the reputation r
for the game of Chicken for s = 4 for different values of the
temperature. The phase transition occurs when r = s/2 = 2
as expected. Inset: Variation of Magnetization (m) with the
cost of injury s for game of Chicken when reputation r = 2 for
different values of the temperature. For lower cost of injury
majority of the players choose straight or defection.
We analyze the game of Chicken in the thermody-
namic limit. This is same as the Hawk−Dove game in
the thermodynamic limit. Following the calculations in
section II to make the correct connection with the Ising
Hamiltonian, we add λ = −a+c2 = s+r2 to column 1 and
µ = − b+d2 = − r2 to column 2 of the payoff matrix Eq.
(18). The transformed payoff matrix for the row player
becomes-
U =
 straight swervestraight r−s2 r2
swerve s−r2 − r2
 .
Comparing this to the Ising game matrix Eq. (11), we
have J + h = r−s2 and J − h = − r2 . Solving these simul-
taneous equations, we have J = − s4 and h = 2r−s4 .In the
thermodynamic limit of the game the Magnetization-
m =
sinh(βh)√
sinh2(βh) + e−4βJ
=
sinh(β 2r−s4 )√
sinh2(β 2r−s4 ) + e
βs
.
(19)
From Eq. (19), the condition for change of sign in “m”
is given by
sinh(β 2r−s4 )√
sinh2(β 2r−s4 ) + e
βs
= 0 =⇒ s = 2r. (20)
Plotting Magnetization (m) as in Eq. (19), we see from
Fig. 4 that as the reputation r increases more than s/2,
more players choose straight as choosing swerve would
bring a higher loss in reputation. Similarly, when r < s/2
then players would rather choose to swerve and not get
injured. Further, it should be noted from Eq. (19) that
as the cost of injury increases (see Fig. 4 inset), the
Magnetization becomes more positive implying that more
players choose to swerve or cooperate.
Since game of Chicken and Hawk-Dove game are equiv-
alent in game theory, it can be inferred from the above
results that for Hawk-Dove game as the value of resource
increases keeping the cost of injury constant, then more
fraction of players choose the Hawk strategy (defect) or
fight for the resource. Further, when the cost of injury
increases then the players are reluctant to fight for the
resource as getting injured is more expensive. Thus,
larger fraction of players end up choosing Dove strat-
egy(cooperate), i.e., sharing the resource when cost of
injury is high.
It is worth noting that contrary to the notion as in two
player games that the players would always opt for the
Nash equilibrium strategy, in the thermodynamic limit
this is not true. In the thermodynamic limit our results
show that a larger fraction of the players would choose
the Nash equilibrium strategy but not every player. For
example, when the temptation decreases in Prisoner’s
dilemma the fraction of cooperators increases even when
the Nash equilibrium is to defect. This is particularly
intriguing as when the choice for every individual should
be to defect as in the two player Prisoner’s dilemma both
players choosing defect, i.e., (D,D) is the Nash equilib-
rium. A natural extension in the thermodynamic limit
would be that every player would choose to defect how-
ever, there is a finite fraction of players who choose coop-
eration which increases as the temptation (t) decreases.
Further, we see in game of Chicken that even if the repu-
tation becomes high still there is a small fraction of play-
ers who choose to swerve and lose. This shows that in
the thermodynamic limit cooperation does emerge even
when defection would be the preferred choice of the in-
dividual players.
6V. CONCLUSIONS
Our aim in this work was to understand how coopera-
tive behavior emerges in the thermodynamic limit? We
observe that in the thermodynamic limit, larger fraction
of players choose the Nash equilibrium strategy of the
two player game. However, there is a finite fraction of
players who don’t opt for the Nash equilibrium strategy.
Further, we see in Prisoner’s dilemma that in thermody-
namic limit slightly reducing the punishment below r/3
where r is the reward increases the fraction of cooperators
by a large amount even when the Nash equilibrium is to
defect. Even in game of “Chicken”, when cost of injury
is low the best choice for the players is to choose straight
or defect. However, we find that still there exist a large
fraction of players who choose to swerve or cooperate. In
future works [6], we extend our model of predicting co-
operative behavior in the thermodynamic limit to Public
goods game with and without punishment.
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VI. APPENDIX
Let’s take the generalized game theory payoff matrix
for two player games
E =
 s1 s2s1 a, a′ b, b′
s2 c, c
′ d, d′
 . (21)
Transforming the elements of the payoff matrix by adding
a factor λ, λ′ to column 1 and µ, µ′ to column 2 we get:
E =
 s1 s2s1 a+ λ, a′ + λ′ b+ µ, b′ + µ′
s2 c+ λ, c
′ + λ′ d+ µ, d′ + µ′
 . (22)
In Ref. [4], it has been shown that under the above trans-
formations as in Eq. (22), the Nash equilibrium remains
unchanged. Different possible combinations for the rela-
tions between a, b, c, and d are taken which give differ-
ent outcomes for the Nash equilibrium. In Ref. [4] each of
those outcomes are considered and then shown to remain
unchanged under the transformation as in Eq. (22).
Herein, we give a simple proof of this above conclusion
using fixed point analysis. A fixed point is a point on
the coordinate space which maps a function to the coor-
dinate. For a two dimensional coordinate space, a fixed
point of a function f(x, y) is mathematically defined as
(x, y) such that [7]
f(x, y) = (x, y). (23)
From Brouwer’s fixed point theorem it is known that a
2D triangle ∆2 has a fixed point property. This implies
that any function which defines all the points inside a
2D triangle has a fixed point (for a detailed proof of this
theorem refer to [7]). Also the probabilities for choosing
a strategy, represents points inside a square of side length
1. Thus S2,2 = (x, y) with 0 < x < 1 and 0 < y < 1,
where x represents the probability of choosing a strategy
by row player and y represents the probability of choosing
a strategy by column player. It can shown that a triangle
and a square are topologically equivalent [7], and this
implies that if a triangle has a fixed point property, so
does a square. So a function is constructed such that it
represents all the points inside the square. To construct
the function [7], a vector with coordinates (u1, u2) and
another vector with coordinate (v1, v2) are defined as
follows- (
u1
u2
)
= A
(
y
1− y
)
, (24)
and (
v1 v2
)
=
(
x 1− x
)
B, (25)
where x and y are the probabilities to choose a particular
strategy. A and B denote the respective payoff matrix
for row player and column player. Using this, the fixed
point function from Eq. (23) is given by
f(x, y) =
(
x+ (u1 − u2)+
1 + |u1 − u2| ,
y + (v1 − v2)+
1 + |v1 − v2|
)
, (26)
where (u1 − u2)+ = u1−u2+|u1−u2|2 and (v1 − v2)+ =
v1−v2+|v1−v2|
2 . We determine u1, u2, v1 and v2 for the
payoff matrix as in Eq. (21) and then the transformed
one Eq. (22). For the payoff matrix Eq. (21) we get the
7coordinates (a′is and b
′
is for i=1,2) as
u1 = ay + b(1− y)
u2 = cy + d(1− y)
v1 = a
′x+ b′(1− x)
v2 = c
′x+ d′(1− x). (27)
Now for the transformed payoff matrix as in Eq. (22) the
fixed point function is given by
f t(x, y) =
(
x+ (ut1 − ut2)+
1 + |ut1 − ut2|
,
y + (vt1 − vt2)+
1 + |vt1 − vt2|
)
. (28)
Again we determine the coordinates (a′is and b
′
is for
i=1,2), as follows from Eq. (24,25)
ut1 = (a+ λ)y + (b+ µ)(1− y)
ut2 = (c+ λ)y + (d+ µ)(1− y)
vt1 = (a
′ + λ′)x+ (b′ + µ′)(1− x)
vt2 = (c
′ + λ′)x+ (d′ + µ′)(1− x). (29)
As we can see from Eq. (27) and Eq. (29), u1 − u2 =
ut1−ut2 = (a−c)y+(b−d)(1−y) and v1−v2 = vt1−vt2 =
(a′−c′)y+(b′−d′)(1−y). Thus, f t(x, y) = f(x, y) which
implies that the Nash equilibrium remains unchanged un-
der the transformations as described before in Eq. (21,
22).
